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I. INTRODUCTION
A substantial stockholder in a public company wishes to sell some
of his shares on the open market. These shares have not been registered
under the Securities Act of 1933.1 Furthermore, the time, expense and
other problems incident to registration make that route impractical. The
question now arises concerning his legal right to sell these unregistered
shares. May he sell any of them? If so, how many and how frequently?
These intensely practical questions have caused grave concern
among securities attorneys and their businessmen clients. The reason
for this concern stems mainly from an understandable inability to find
the answers in the governing statutory provision, Section 4(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, as implemented by Rule 154.2
In the event of a public distribution of securities, the Securities Act
of 1933 attempts to provide investor protection through full disclosure of
all material facts. The required information is disclosed in a registration
statement and prospectus filed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission; the prospectus must be given to prospective investors. More
* Professor of Law, University of Miami. This article has been adapted from a chapter
in a book on the Securities Act of 1933, to be published soon by Matthew Bender & Co.,
New York, N.Y. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance and suggestions
of Mr. Arnold Schatzman in the preparation of this article.
1. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-(aa) (1958). Throughout the
remainder of this article the Securities Act of 1933 is referred to solely by section numbers.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1949). This rule, in effect, exempts brokers' transactions for a
customer when the broker is acting as a broker rather than as an underwriter, and when
certain other conditions are observed. For a full discussion of Rule 154, see text of this
article following footnote 19.
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particularly, Section 5 of the Act makes it unlawful to use "any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or of the mails" to sell securities unless a registration state-
ment is in effect. This registration requirement applies both to the
distribution of a new issue and to a redistribution of outstanding securi-
ties which "takes on the characteristics of a new offering by reason of the
control of the issuer possessed by those responsible for the offering."3 In
short, secondary distributions by controlling shareholders must be regis-
tered. However, Section 4 of the Act contains specific exemptions from
the registration requirements. Moreover, Section 4(2) as implemented
by Rule 154 and as currently interpreted may permit a controlling per-
son to dispose of a portion of his securities on the open market within
certain limitations. Section 4(2) exempts: "Brokers' transactions, ex-
ecuted upon customers' orders on any exchange or in the open or
counter market, but not the solicitation of such orders."
II. BACKGROUND OF SECTION 4(2)
The purpose of this section was to exempt the ordinary brokerage
transaction. Thus when John Jones sells 100 shares of ABC, Inc. through
his broker, that brokerage transaction is exempted from the registration
requirements of the Act. "To summarize: Section 4(2) permits individuals
to sell their securities through a broker in an ordinary brokerage trans-
action . . .without regard to the registration and prospectus require-
ments of Section 5 .. .
Thus far the language and purpose of the section appear plain and
simple. But, as so often happens, through "interpretation" the section has
become a veritable nightmare. For example, suppose that X, a controlling
person, wishes to sell his securities through a broker. Assuming that X
complies with the quantitative and other limitations of the section and
its Rule 154, is it not reasonable to assume that such a transaction is
entitled to the exemption? After all, the section does exempt "brokers'
transactions." But the position was taken at an early date that the
exemption applies only to the broker's part of the transaction and does not
extend to the selling customer, who must find his own exemption.5 Con-
sequently, through "interpretation" what appeared to be a transaction
exemption has become a "brokers' exemption," even though the broker is
acting as the seller's agent. This type of reasoning is difficult to accept,
but the interpretation is well entrenched and, until rejected by judicial
decision, must be dealt with as it exists. In practical effect, the ordinary
seller may rely on the first clause of Section 4 (1) of the Act which exempts
"transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter or
3. Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589, 595 (1946). See also H. R. Rup. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 13-14 (1933).
4. Ira Haupt & Co., supra note 3, at 604.
5. SEC Securities Act Release No. 131, March 13, 1934.
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dealer," for he falls within none of these categories.' But the problem
is intensified when a person in a control relationship with the issuer wishes
to sell securities through a broker. The point is that the exemption con-
tained in the first clause of Section 4(1) may not be available for the
reason that such a seller is an "issuer" or an "underwriter." This problem
and related questions are discussed below.
III. THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL
Inasmuch as the exemption afforded by Section 4(2) and Rule 154
is of current significance with respect to transactions by controlling
persons, the first question for consideration is: Who is a controlling
person? The answer is not an easy one, for no single factor determines the
control status. Rather, several factors may play a part in the determination
of control in a particular case. Perhaps as good a general statement as
any is contained in the following letter from the staff of the Commission,
written in response to a company president's request for advice con-
cerning past and proposed unregistered sales of stock:
Dear Sir:
Your letter of has been received and it
is primarily the responsibility of the issuer, its officers and
directors, its counsel and affiliated persons to determine which
of the outstanding shares of ABC, Inc. may be resold without
violating the registration requirements of the Securities Act.
Generally speaking, however, any shares issued in the names
of persons occupying a controlling relationship with the issuer of
such securities or their nominees at the time of their transac-
tions in the stock would be subject to this prohibition. Like-
wise, any such shares issued in the name of any person who
would be considered an "underwriter," within the definition
of that term in Section 2(11) of the Securities Act, would be
subject to registration. An "underwriter," within the definition
of this term, is a person who acquires stock from an issuer or its
"controlling stockholder" for the purpose of resale or sells such
stock for the account of these persons.
The term "controlling stockholder," as I have used it in
this letter, is a question of fact dependent upon the circumstances
of each transaction. It is not a narrow one, depending upon a
mathematical formula of 51 per cent of voting power, but is gen-
erally considered to mean "the possession, direct or indirect, of
the power to direct or cause the direction of the management
and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of
voting securities, by contract, or otherwise." (See Rule 405 of
the General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act.)
6. Of course, even a non-controlling person may become a statutory underwriter, e.g.,
where he has purchased his securities as part of a private placement and immediately
resells without a bona fide change of circumstances. See Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267
F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
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While, as I have stated, the question presented is a factual
issue, the stock issued to L. A. Jones, Mary C. Jones, individually
and jointly, Roger Smith, John Thompson and M. 0. Brown,
or their nominees, would on the basis of the information thus
far ascertained by us seemingly fall within the "control" category
I have discussed. Also, stock transferred from any of these
persons pursuant to an investment letter would also be subject
to the same restrictions.
If any of these persons were in no way connected with
the management of the corporation, either directly or indirectly,
at the time of their sale of the stock, such transactions may have
been entitled to the exemption from registration provided in
the first clause of Section 4(1) of the Act. However, this would
only be true if they had held the stock long enough to establish
an investment interest and it was fully paid for.
Furthermore, as you know, any transactions in the stock,
regardless of whether it may be exempt from registration, are
subject to the prohibitions of Section 17(a) of the Act. Con-
sequently, any sale of the stock by the issuer or by any person
occupying a "controlling" relationship with the issuer, without
a full disclosure of the present financial condition of the
corporation and other comparable material information, would
probably run afoul of this Section.
Very truly yours,
The italicized portion of the foregoing letter was taken from Rule
405. That rule serves as a general guidepost. But, at least by implication,
it involves numerous other factors which are discussed below.
A. Stock Ownership
While it is obvious that record or beneficial ownership of more than
one-half of the voting securities constitutes control, it is equally apparent
that one (or a group) owning less than that amount may occupy the
status of a controlling person.7 In this connection, Item 19 of Form S-1,
the most generally used application form for registration, requires the
registrant to list each person who owns "more than 10 per cent" of any
class of voting securities. Awareness of this fact has caused most
securities attorneys to conclude that the ownership of ten per cent or more
of the voting securities in and of itself spells control. Furthermore, this
"minority control" can exist in numerous forms, including: (1) pyramid-
ing through holding companies; (2) issuance of a larger class of non-
voting stock coupled with the issuance of a comparatively small amount
7. Thompson Ross Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111, 1119 (1940): "The question of 'control'
is a factual question. 'Control' is not synonymous with the ownership of 51 percent of
the voting stock of a corporation. Where power exists to direct the management and
policies of a corporation, 'control' within the meaning of § 2(11) exists even though the
persons who possess that power do not own a majority of the corporation's voting stock."
1963]
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of voting stock; (3) the placement of comparatively few shares in the
hands of one person or one group coupled with wide distribution of the
remainder; (4) proxy control through committees; (5) control through
voting trusts or protective committees in reorganization or bankruptcy
proceedings.
Finally, in terms of stock ownership, it is clear that ownership of
less than ten per cent does not spell absence of control. As indicated in the
foregoing letter from the Commission, there is no "mathematical formula"
for determining control. Other factors require consideration.
B. Power To Direct Management and Policies
A test frequently used in determining the existence of control con-
cerns the ability of the person or group in question to direct management
and policies of the issuer. As the court observed in the Micro-Moisture
case,8 "the defendants were in control because they possessed and
exercised the power to direct the management and policies of Micro-
Moisture (Rule 405) and particularly were in a position to obtain
the required signatures of Micro-Moisture and its officers and directors
on a registration statement." (Italics added.) In this connection, it
is important to note that the person or group in question need not
exercise day-to-day managerial functions. The fact that the power to
direct management and policy exists is sufficient for purposes of con-
trol. This power may stem from one or more of several sources.
Domination of officers and members of the board of directors or executive
committee is a common example.' ° Similarly, such control might arise
from interlocking corporate directorships or, as indicated in Rule 405,
from contractual arrangements."
C. Officers and Directors as Controlling Persons
The fact that a person is an officer or director does not in and of
itself spell control. Indeed, the fact that an officer or director consistently
8. SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 558, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), final
injunction, 167 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd sub norm., SEC v. Culpepper, 270
F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959).
9. "It cannot be accepted that Walston believed that an employee driving an auto-
mobile controls that vehicle to the exclusion of his employer or that the officers of a
corporation, in the exercise of their day-to-day and detailed managerial functions, control
the corporation to the exclusion of a dominating financial interest." Walston & Co., 7 S.E.C.
937, 950 (1940). See also Thompson Ross Sec. Co., supra note 7, at 1121 (purchase from
husband and wife with a view to distribution, where husband "could direct the policies of
the issuer along whatever lines he deemed desirable," was a purchase from controlling
person, making exemption under first clause of § 4(1) unavailable for subsequent sales to
public).
10. Resources Corp. Int'l, 7 S.E.C. 689, 716-18 (1940).
11. Canusa Gold Mines, Ltd., 2 S.E.C. 548, 555 (1937) (underwriting agreement
empowered underwriter to name a majority of the board of directors); Reiter-Foster Oil
Corp., 6 S.E.C. 1028, 1044 (1940) (underwriter imposed condition precedent to under-
writing that control of board be turned over to him).
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opposed the policies of management or of those persons in mathematical
control would tend to negate control on his part. 2 Similarly, a proxy con-
test or other evidence of dissatisfaction or conflict between the director
or officer and management would indicate an absence of control on his
part, especially if large blocks of 'stock held by other persons or groups
have been used to outvote him. On the other hand, factors tending to
indicate a control status would include: participation in active manage-
ment by the officer or director or a member of his family; the necessity
of his or his family's stock to establish a quorum at annual stockholders'
meetings; his consistent acquiescence, in management policies; his
ownership, record or beneficial, of perhaps five per cent or more of the
outstanding voting securities. In the final analysis, of course, as stated
previously, no single factor is determinative of a control relationship. At
most, the foregoing factors should be considered in the light of the
circumstances surrounding the particular situation.
A final word is in order on officers and directors. The fact that an
officer or director has resigned and thus has no official connection with
his company does not necessarily terminate what would otherwise be a
control status. Through his stockholdings or through some other arrange-
ments, formal or informal, he may be able to exert a very real influence
on management policies.
IV. SALES BY CONTROLLING PERSONS
As stated previously, secondary distributions by controlling persons
must be registered. Put another way, if a broker is selling for a con-
trolling person in connection with a distribution, he is acting as an under-
writer rather than as a broker. Consequently, the sales on behalf of the
controlling person are not "brokers' transactions" and are not exempt
under Section 4(2). Furthermore, if the securities are not registered,
the broker will have violated Section 5, the section of the Act requiring
registration, and the controlling person will have been exposed to liability
as a principal under the federal statute prohibiting aiding and abetting. 8
It is obvious, then, that the words "underwriter" and "distribution" are
of prime importance for the purpose of determining the availability of
an exemption for sales by controlling persons.
Section 2 (11) defines an "underwriter" as
12. In United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), although
defendant was not a director, the court observed with respect to this point: "The evidence
does not sustain the second charge that Sherwood was at the time of the sales a 'control
person.' To the contrary, although Sherwood dominated 8% of the total issued stock,
he was unable to secure a representation on the board of directors, he had had a falling-out
with . . . the dominant figure in the management . .. ."
13. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2(b). Apparently the only case where it may make a difference
whether the controlling person has violated § 5 himself or has aided and abetted in its viola-
tion is where unusual circumstances make it more advantageous to proceed against the
controlling person alone without joining the broker-underwriter.
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any person who . . . sells for an issuer in connection with, the
distribution of any security . . . . [A]s used in this paragraph
the term "issuer" shall include . . . any person . . . controlling
... the issuer ....
It is at once apparent that the last sentence of the foregoing section
defines a controlling person as an "issuer" for the purpose of determining
whether the person who sells for him is an "underwriter."'1 4 Moreover, the
purpose of that last sentence is to require registration of secondary distri-
butions through underwriters by controlling stockholders. 15 In sum, one
may be a statutory underwriter even though he has no connection with
the securities business. A common example occurs when one makes a
secondary distribution of securities for the account of a person who is in
a control relationship with the issuer of the securities. Accordingly, when
Section 2(11) is read in conjunction with the first clause of Section 4(1)
("Transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter or
dealer") and Section 4 (2), the following principles emerge:
1. If X is in control of ABC, Inc., he is an "issuer" for the purpose
of making an underwriter any person who purchases from him or sells
for him in connection with a distribution of his securities.
2. If X, the controlling person, purchases his securities with a view
to distribution, he himself is an "underwriter," making the exemption
contained in the first clause unavailable to him.' 6
It should be stressed, however, that in the foregoing examples or in
similar situations involving controlling persons, the Section 4(1) exemp-
tion is unavailable to the seller and the Section 4(2) exemption is
unavailable to the broker only if the "underwriter" takes from the
"issuer" with a view to distribution. To put it another way, all under-
writing involves distribution. If the transaction in question does not
involve "distribution," there is no underwriting. Thus if B, a broker,
sells securities for X, the controlling person, and the transaction does not
14. Although an argument can be made to the contrary, it is the generally accepted view
and the informal position of the Commission's staff that the purpose of the term "issuer" as
used in the last sentence of § 2(11) is limited to determining whether one who purchases
from a controlling person is an "underwriter." According to this view, a person who pur-
chases from one in control of the issuing corporation in connection with a distribution is an
underwriter, but the person in control of the corporation is not an issuer for the purpose of
an exemption under §§ 3 and 4 of the Act or for the purpose of signing a registration state-
ment.
15. "It is clear from Section 4(1), read in conjunction with Section 2(11), that public
distributions by controlling persons, through underwriters, are intended generally to be sub-
ject to the registration and prospectus requirements of the Act." Ira Haupt & Co., supra
note 3, at 601.
16. "Section 4(1) exempts trading transactions between individual investors with respect
to securities already issued. It does not exempt distributions by issuers or control persons or
acts of other individuals who engage in steps necessary to such distributions." SEC Securities
Act Release No. 4445, Feb. 2, 1962. Similarly, the exemption under the first clause of § 4(1)
is not available to a dealer making a distribution of its securities. Stadia Oil & Uranium Co.
v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1957).
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involve a "distribution," B is acting as a broker rather than as an under-
writer, thus making the Section 4(2) exemption available to him and
the Section 4(1) exemption available to X, assuming that X is also not
engaged in a distribution. The next logical question, then, concerns the
meaning of "distribution."
Prior to the Haupt case 7 the position of the Commission was to the
effect that even "an underwriter selling for a controlling stockholder over
the exchange might conceivably be entitled to the exemption under
Section 4(2) if his activities were confined strictly to the usual brokerage
functions, but that, as a practical matter, his activities could not be so
confined in connection with a distribution of any substantial block of
securities."'8 (Italics added.) The Commission went on to state, however,
that such an interpretation was given before it realized that "large blocks
can frequently be sold without solicitations or other sales activity."
(Approximately 93,000 unregistered shares had been distributed in such
a manner by Ira Haupt & Co. for the Schulte interests, controlling share-
holders in Park & Tilford.) Accordingly, against the background of a
"very different market," the pre-1946 interpretation, to some extent
at least, was "overruled." The actual holding in Haupt was to the effect
that a broker making a distribution for a controlling shareholder acts
as an underwriter and cannot avail himself of the exemption in Section
4(2) for brokers' transactions. The opinion took the position that Section
4(2) was intended to distinguish between "trading" (exempt) and
"distribution" (non-exempt) transactions. Much was made of this
distinction, but the opinion caused confusion among brokers because of
the absence of any concrete definitions of "trading" and "distribution."
In short, the Haupt case left open the questions of when a broker was
acting as a broker and when he was acting as an underwriter? It was for
this reason that Rule 154 was adopted. That rule was an attempt to
furnish standards for determining whether a particular transaction is
that of a broker or an underwriter, i.e., whether the transaction involves
trading or distribution.'
V. RULE 154: GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Rule 154 permits casual trading by controlling persons by defining
"brokers' transactions" to include transactions which might otherwise
be considered as transactions by an underwriter requiring registration.
17. Ira Haupt & Co., supra note 3.
18. Id. at 605.
19. "To obviate certain misapprehensions which had arisen following the Commission's
decision in Ira Haupt & Co., Rule 154 was adopted in 1954 as an interpretation of the
statute in cases in which the broker is acting for a control person, 'to provide,' as the Com-
mission stated at the time, 'a ready guide for routine cases involving trading, as distinguished
from distributing transactions .... '" Remarks of Harold Lese, Chief Counsel, SEC Div. of
Corp. Fin., Fed. Bar Ass'n Briefing Session, Wash., D.C., June 1, 1961.
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But, in line with its position on Section 4(2), the Commission does not
consider Rule 154 to furnish an exemption for the seller:
Rule 154 . . . is too often referred to as the selling control
person exemption. It must be appreciated that Rule 154 was
in no way intended, nor does it by interpretation provide an
exemption to control persons. Rule 154 is the selling broker's
exemption. The selling control person must find his own exemp-
tion for the sale of his stocks. Generally, it is found in the first
clause of Section 4(1) of the Securities Act for "transactions by
any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.""
As noted previously in connection with the discussion of Section 4(2),
this reasoning is difficult to follow in view of the fact that the section
and the rule exempt "transactions." In any event, the selling control
person is indirectly protected by Rule 154 in the sense that, if he is not
making a distribution, the resulting availability of the exemption to the
broker spells availability to the seller's own exemption for his part of
the transaction under the first clause of Section 4(1).
A final general observation: it should be noted that the exemption
under Section 4(2) and Rule 154 is confined to transactions "on any
exchange or in the open or counter market." It is obvious, then, that the
exemption is limited to transactions in the course of trading in outstanding
securities. Accordingly, purchases made directly from an issuer during
a primary distribution are not considered as transactions "in the open
or counter market."
VI. LIMITATIONS ON APPLICABILITY OF RULE 154
Rule 154 defines "brokers' transactions" to include transactions
by a broker acting for controlling persons where-
(1) the broker performs no more than the usual and customary
broker's function,
(2) the broker does no more than execute an order or orders to
sell as a broker and receives no more than the usual or
customary broker's commission, and the broker's principal,
to the knowledge of the broker, makes no payment in con-
nection with the execution of such transactions to any other
person,
(3) neither the broker, nor to his knowledge his principal,
solicits or arranges for the solicitation of orders to buy in
anticipation of or in connection with such transactions, and
(4) the broker is not aware of circumstances indicating that
his principal is an underwriter in respect of the securities
or that the transactions are part of a distribution of securi-
ties on behalf of his principal.2
20. Ibid.
21. 17 C.F.R. § 230.154(a) (1949).
[VOL. XVIII
SALES OF SHARES
A. "Usual and Customary Broker's Function"
In order to qualify for the Section 4(2) exemption, the first con-
dition provides that the broker perform no more than the usual broker's
function. In other words, he must act as a broker rather than as a
dealer or underwriter. In this connection, a dealer acts as a principal
rather than as an agent. Typically, a dealer buys for his own account
and sells to a customer from his own inventory. The dealer's profit or
loss is the difference between the price he pays and the price he receives
for the same security.22 But a broker acts as an agent who buys and sells
for the account of others and charges a commission for his services. In
short, satisfaction of this first condition requires that the broker act for
his principal as an agent, receive commissions and take no profit and loss
risks.28
B. Broker Must Receive Usual Commission: Seller Must Not Pay Any
Otker Person
In the case of stock exchange transactions there is a fixed schedule
of commissions. Thus, no problem is presented with respect to what con-
stitutes "the usual or customary broker's commission." '24 But there are
no set commissions with respect to unlisted securities.25 The suggestion
has been advanced that, in order to insure satisfaction of this condition,
the broker's commission should not exceed the equivalent of what would
be a stock exchange commission on the same transaction-with the added
proviso that the broker can safely charge a higher commission if he
can establish that it would be usual and customary in similar transactions
in unlisted securities.26 Finally, the broker must not be aware that the
seller has made any payments to other persons in connection with the
transaction. In all likelihood, knowledge on the part of the broker of
indirect payments to public relations firms or others in a position to create
or stimulate a market for the securities would spell loss of the exemption.
C. Solicitation
As a third condition, Rule 154 expressly provides that there must be
no solicitation of buy orders. In other words, if the broker solicits the
22. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786
(1943). See also Arleen W. Hughes, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4048 (Feb.
20, 1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
23. Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, supra note 16, at 275 (holding that the availa-
bility of the § 4(2) exemption does not depend upon a firm's general activity as a broker
but upon the capacity in which it executed the particular transaction).
24. New York Stock Exchange Commissions, for example, currently average approxi-
mately 1% of the market value of the shares involved in the transaction and approximately
V4 of 1% on bonds.
25. See National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 3623 (1944).
26. See Symposium-Current Problems of Securities Underwriters and Dealers, 18 Bus.
Law. 27, 60 (1962).
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purchaser to buy the security, the exemption is lost. On the other hand,
the fact that he solicits the seller to sell the security does not destroy the
exemption.
The prohibition against solicitation of buy orders poses some prob-
lems. First of all, with respect to stock exchange transactions, where a
public "auction" occurs prior to a completed purchase and sale, the ex-
ecution of an ordinary sell order does not constitute solicitation of an
order to buy. Similarly, an institutional advertisement by a brokerage
firm would not constitute the solicitation of an order to buy any particular
security. But suppose that the broker discusses the security in a market
letter or, even though he gives no advice or recommendation concerning
a security, informs his clients by mail that the security is being offered
and proffers his services in purchasing that security. Certainly these activi-
ties would amount to solicitation of buy orders. With respect to transac-
tions in unlisted securities, paragraph (d) of Rule 154 provides: "Where
within the previous 60 days a dealer has made a written bid for a security
or a written solicitation of an offer to sell such security, the term 'solicita-
tion' in Section 4(2) shall not be deemed to include an inquiry regarding
the dealer's bid or solicitation." The term "written bid" obviously in-
cludes bids in the National Daily Quotation Sheets ("pink sheets") as
well as other written bids of any type. Conversely, asking a broker who
has no bid on the security in the sheets or other writing would constitute
solicitation of an order to buy. Pertinent comments by the Commission
on this portion of the rule are reproduced in the margin.
28
Suppose that the solicitation of a buy order is conducted without
using either the mails or facilities of interstate commerce, but that the re-
sulting sale involves use of such means. Is the exemption available? On
this point the Commission has taken the position that solicitation of a
buy order by any means prevents the application of the exemption to any
subsequent step taken to complete the sale or delivery after sale. 9
27. "[T]his construction is based on the fact that the statute is designed primarily for
the protection of buyers rather than for the protection of sellers." SEC Securities Act Release
No. 3421, Aug. 2, 1951. Rule 154(c) expressly provides: "The term 'solicitation of such
orders' in Section 4(2) of the Act shall be deemed to include the solicitation of an order to
buy a security, but shall not be deemed to include the solicitation of an order to sell a
security."
28. While paragraph (a) of the rule makes it clear that there is no exemption for
the solicitation of orders to buy, a question remains as to what constitutes 'solicita-
tion' where a broker for a seller approaches a dealer who is bidding for the security
or solicitating orders to sell it to him. Paragraph (b) [now (d) I of the rule provides
that where the dealer's solicitation or bid is in writing, the broker's inquiry about
it is not a 'solicitation' within the meaning of Section 4(2). Paragraph (b)[d]
recognizes also that, in the over-the-counter market, dealers interested in buying a
particular security may not publish a quotation on indication of interest in it every
day or every week. To some extent such quotations are published in monthly servi-
ces, and to allow for the delays incident to such publications the rule provides, in
effect, that the brokers can rely on bids or indications of buying interest originating
as much as 60 days previously as indicating that a dealer is soliciting sell orders, so
that the broker, in calling the dealer, would not be deemed to be soliciting him.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 3421, supra note 27.
29. See Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147, 171 (1935).
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D. Broker Must Not Be Aware that Principal is Underwriter or that
Distribution is in Progress
As has been stated by the Chief Counsel of the Commission's Division
of Corporation Finance:
If a controlling person is barred by the Act from selling his stock
without registration for any reason other than merely being a
controlling person (as in the case where he would be a statutory
underwriter by reason of his receiving shares pursuant to a pur-
ported private offering but not holding the shares for invest-
ment or in the case where he recently exercised a stock option)
then Rule 154 will not permit the sale of his shares without
prior registration or qualification under Regulation A. In such
an instance, the controlling person is a statutory underwriter."0
The taking of securities for investment concerns the private offering ex-
emption in the second clause of Section 4(1),11 but the point is that the
Commission takes the position that Section 4(2) and Rule 154 are not
available for investment stock or, for that matter, for any situation where
the seller may not sell his unregistered securities "for any reason other
than merely being a controlling person."82 In other words, in such situa-
tions the seller is an underwriter and the broker participates in the
distribution, thus making him an underwriter also. Accordingly, if the
broker is aware that his principal is an underwriter, as the rule specifies,
the Section 4(2) exemption is not available. Similarly, the exemption
under the first clause of Section 4(1) would not be available to the seller.
Thus, it is apparent that in determining whether the brokers' transactions
exemption is available, the exemption relied on by the controlling seller
must be examined.
In sum, in order to avail himself of the exemption, the broker must
make a reasonable investigation-with respect to the controlling person's
status as an underwriter and with respect to whether the proposed trans-
action will constitute a distribution. A reasonable investigation presup-
poses reasonable inquiries by the broker concerning the pertinent facts
and circumstances with respect to the controlling person and the proposed.
transaction. In this connection, reference is made to an important Com-
mission release.83
30. Lese, supra note 19.
31. "[T]ransactions by an issuer not ... involving any public offering . ".. 
32. Similarly, if the controlling person acquires his securities as the result of a merger
or consolidation, Rule 154 is not applicable. But such a controlling person's sales may be
exempted under Rules 133(d) and (e).
33. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445, Feb. 2, 1962. See also Israels, Checklist for
Broker-Dealer Inquiry as to Customer's "Control" or "Underwriter" Relationship; Or Where
Sale of Securities Proposed in "Brokerage Transaction" in Reliance Upon S.E.C. Rule 154,
18 Bus. LAw. 94 (1962) ; Skiatron Electronics & Television Corp., SEC Securities Act Release
No. 4282 (Oct. 3, 1960). In SEC v. Mono-Kearsage Consol. Mining Co., 167 F. Supp. 248,
255 (D. Utah 1958), where the issuer merely took the word of "investment buyers," the
1963]
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E. Quantitative Limitations: The "One Per Cent Rule"
Paragraph (b) of Rule 154 represents an attempt to distinguish
between "trading" and "distribution." First, the paragraph provides that
the term "distribution" is not applicable "to transactions involving an
amount not substantial in relation to the number of shares or units of
the security outstanding and aggregate volume of trading in such se-
curity." Then, in effect, it permits casual trades by controlling persons
to the amount of approximately one per cent of the outstanding securities
of the issuer within any six-month period, except that where the security
is listed on a national securities exchange, the controlling person can
sell up to the lesser of approximately one per cent of the outstanding
shares or of the largest aggregate reported volume of trading on the ex-
change during any one week within the four calendar weeks preceding
the receipt of the sell order. Thus if in addition to satisfying the four
conditions previously discussed, these quantitative limitations are ob-
served, there is no "distribution" and the exemption is available.
Several interpretative problems arise when the one per cent formula
is applied. First, it should be noted that the rule uses the word "approxi-
mately." It is probable, then, that sales by a controlling person slightly
in excess of the one per cent figure would qualify for the exemption.
Secondly, may a controlling person sell the maximum one per cent
in as many successive six-month periods as he wishes? Although the
Commission has taken no official position on this point, the writer is in-
formed that the staff of the Commission, realizing that such continuous
activity has all the attributes of a "bailout" pattern, feels that a "distribu-
tion" is involved and that the exemption is not available.8 4 Assuming this
position to be correct, it will behoove the broker to inquire concerning
sales by the controlling person during the preceding six months and his
intended future sales of the security. Such an inquiry will bear directly
upon his "awareness" of a distribution and consequent availability or loss
of the exemption.
The next question for consideration concerns what sales must be
included in the one per cent computation. On this point, paragraph (b)
provides that "the term 'distribution' shall not be deemed to include a
sale or series of sales of securities which, together with all other sales
of securities of the same class" do not exceed the percentage or volume
limitations of the regulation. (Italics added.) In other words, all sales
by a controlling person within the preceding six months under an exemp-
court stated: "[A]n issuer cannot take at face value the assurance of buyers that they buy
only for investment purposes when circumstances would show to a reasonable person that
these assurances are formal rather than real."
34. Query: What amounts to a "pattern"? 1% sales in more than two successive six-
month periods? It is most difficult to draw any precise line between "trading" and "distribu-
tion" in such situations.
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tion or even a registration statement must be included in the one per cent
calculation. By way of illustration, suppose that X, a controlling person,
has sold during the past six months in excess of one per cent of his com-
pany's outstanding common stock in a Regulation A offering. The Sec-
tion 4(2) exemption as implemented by Rule 154(b) is not available for
additional sales. Similarly, suppose that X sells in excess of one per cent
in an intrastate offering under the Section 3(a)(11) exemption or in a
direct private placement under the second clause of Section 4(1). In
neither of these cases is the rule available for additional sales. Finally,
suppose that X has sold during the past six months five per cent of his
company's outstanding common stock under a registration statement
and now seeks to sell an additional one per cent in a brokerage transac-
tion under the rule. The exemption is not available. 5 These computation
principles serve to reemphasize the necessity of reasonable precautionary
measures by way of inquiry on the part of the broker before executing a
proposed sale for a controlling person.3"
Closely related to the foregoing computation problems is the ques-
tion of whose stock must be included in the one per cent calculation. To
put it another way, is Rule 154 available for brokerage transactions in-
volving more than one controlling person during any six-month period?
Paragraph (b) of the rule refers to "sales ... by or on behalf of the same
person." It is clear that where more than one individual is in a control
relationship and those individuals are not related through family, con-
tractual or economic ties and do not have joint ownership of the securi-
ties, each such individual is a "person" for purposes of the one per cent
ceiling. Conversely, where such "group" factors are present, it is highly
probable that all individuals in the control group constitute one "person"
for computation purposes.
VII. CONCLUSION
Section 4(2) as implemented by Rule 154 warrants careful study.
Under certain circumstances the section and the rule may provide a
welcome avenue for legal avoidance of the registration and prospectus
requirements of the Act. But cautious attorneys for both controlling
35. Conversely, however, since Rule 154 speaks in terms of "all other sales . . .within
the preceding period of six months," it appears that the controlling person can sell the 1%
under the rule and subsequently sell additional securities of the same class under a registra-
tion statement.
36. See authorities cited note 33 supra. A question that remains unansweed at the
present time is whether shares which have been pledged and upon which there has been
no default or foreclosure would have to be included in the 1% computation. The answer, of
course, depends upon whether a bona fide pledge is a "sale" within the meaning of the rule.
See SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 364 U.S. 819
(1960).
37. Section 2(2): "The term 'person' means an individual, a corporation, a partnership,
an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, any unincorporated organization or a govern-
ment or political subdivision thereof."
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persons and brokers should weigh all pertinent facts surrounding the
proposed transaction before giving a green-light opinion. Otherwise, il-
legal evasion and serious consequences may follow. It is hoped that the
discussion contained in this article may aid the attorney in advising his
clients in this important area of securities regulation.
